OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications
Details the threats, attack consequences, security considerations, and best practices to take into account when developing browser-based applications that use OAuth 2.0. Published as BCP 212.
Run date 2026-08-23 (UTC) · 48-hour window · covering all groups
OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications
Details the threats, attack consequences, security considerations, and best practices to take into account when developing browser-based applications that use OAuth 2.0. Published as BCP 212.
Incremental Forwarding of HTTP Messages
Specifies the 'Incremental' HTTP header field, which instructs HTTP intermediaries to forward the HTTP message incrementally.
Defines GRACE, an application profile for one bounded grid.curtailment action. The profile binds an exact action to a finite participation envelope, distinct human approvals when required, one-attempt executor admission, an authenticated actuator acknowledgment, separately authenticated meter observations, an Action State Signed Statement, and one-time admission to a settlement effect; missing or ambiguous post-invocation evidence is preserved as indeterminate and cannot authorize blind retry. GRACE verifies signed inputs and deterministic computations only — it does not establish physical meter truth, baseline correctness, tariff eligibility, or payment. An optional hybrid profile combines Ed25519 with ML-DSA-65, requiring both signatures to verify.
Specifies a DKIM (RFC 6376) iteration that allows cryptographic verification of SMTP (RFC 5321) envelope data and of any signature along the message path, even beyond changes to RFC 5322 message content. It aims to close existing security gaps and introduces active mitigations for collateral damage from more recent email solutions, moving complexity away from lower network layers where such problems cannot be solved. It updates DKIM in aspects that practice has shown to be superfluous, incomplete, or obsolete.
Specifies the 'linkid' URI scheme and a resolution model for persistent, location-independent identifiers. A LinkID identifies a resource independently of its current network location, and resolution maps the persistent identifier to a current actionable URI using one or more resolvers. It targets Web, document, archival, scientific, government, enterprise, and machine-to-machine references where locations may change while the reference identity must stay stable.
Defines a serialization-independent structured Value model for use by derived-identifier constructions and profiles. A Value consists of exact context octets, exact content octets, and a finite set of scoped opaque identifiers. The model specifies structural admission, exact equivalence, where distinctions that affect comparison are placed, and rules for importing identifiers from independently governed systems. It deliberately does not define a wire format, canonicalization, hash, identifier syntax, profile, resolver, registry, or trust model — those are left to surrounding specifications.
Within the SCITT architecture, distinct Issuers may need to agree on the same CWT Subject Claim (sub) value for a common Subject. This document defines a profile letting Issuers independently compute that common value from shared, application-defined Subject semantics without a central assigning authority. An application maps its Subject to an admitted structured Value; the profile defines an exact deterministic binding encoding, SHA-256 derivation, a text representation, and verification rules. Optional JSON and CBOR forms are provided for exchanging a Value but are not Statement payload formats, and SCITT Statement/signature/Receipt state are not inputs to the derivation.
Addresses the problem that when separate implementations derive identifiers and later compare them for equality, interoperability depends on more than the final syntax or digest algorithm — they need common semantics for scope, which distinctions matter, and how identifiers are derived. Otherwise values meant to be equivalent can yield different identifiers, or a relevant distinction can be erased before a lossy or cryptographic step. The document gives principles for specifications defining such identifiers, covering the comparison domain and equivalence relation, complete derivation semantics, and processing that can create false matches. It does not define a new identifier syntax, canonicalization, resolver, registry, trust framework, or hash procedure.
Presents technical evidence — tied to CVE-2026-33697 and EUVD-2026-16488 — that intra-handshake attestation fails in practice even without physical access to the device. It argues that, because continuous attestation is generally required anyway, performing attestation inside the handshake adds unnecessary complexity. The results are backed by reproducible ProVerif models and artifacts released under Apache-2.0, and the findings have been acknowledged by the relevant stakeholders.
Specifies integration of two composite post-quantum signature schemes into the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. Each scheme combines the post-quantum Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with an elliptic-curve signature algorithm (Ed25519 and ECDSA, respectively) to provide security against both quantum and classical adversaries.
Specifies Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN), an overlay scheme for multi-tenant virtualized data centers usable by cloud providers and enterprises. This revision obsoletes RFC 7348 and moves the VXLAN specification into the IETF document stream, enabling standardized extensions that add to the VXLAN header and register them with IANA. The format and processing described remain fully compatible with those in RFC 7348.
In networks deploying Layer 2 interface bundles (such as a Link Aggregation Group per IEEE 802.1AX), a controller may need the connectivity relationships between individual bundle members for traffic-engineering purposes such as topology management and bidirectional path computation. This document describes how OSPF and IS-IS advertise the remote interface identifiers for Layer 2 bundle members, and specifies the corresponding BGP Link-State (BGP-LS) extension.
Specifies the Secure Collaborative State Workspace Protocol (SCSWP), a stateful, continuously authenticated protocol letting multiple clients on heterogeneous networks securely access and collaboratively manage a shared file workspace on a central authoritative server. It defines a full lifecycle: key-dissolving bootstrap provisioning, mutual X.509 authentication, ephemeral ECDH producing a three-level key hierarchy (K1/K2/K3), continuous trust evaluation, capability-based authorization, workspace-aware congestion control, concurrent file operations via locks and optimistic version control, a hash-chained audit ledger, and session continuity/recovery (DNAC). Its core principle is that client trust is evaluated continuously and cryptographically, not fixed at login.
x402 is an application-level protocol for internet-native payments built on the HTTP 402 (Payment Required) status code. This draft defines how a domain advertises its x402 payment capability out-of-band so that clients, autonomous agents, and indexers can discover it without prior configuration or a central directory. It specifies a JSON capability manifest at the well-known URI /.well-known/x402 plus an optional DNS TXT record at _x402 pointing to that manifest, letting a consumer resolve a bare domain to verified x402 capability with at most one DNS query and one HTTPS GET.
One more of the IETF's self-descriptive documents. In an age where agentic tooling makes it trivial to produce large volumes of text, this document explains — to both humans and agents — what the IETF is about, how to succeed there, and common pitfalls that reduce the quality of one's time in the organization. It deliberately does not cover the arcane mechanics of how documents progress through adoption, consensus, editing, and publication, focusing instead on the people and culture of the IETF.
Describes the architecture of the Participant Relationship Protocol (PRP), which treats a relationship — rather than an address, route, transport connection, or identity — as the primary persistent context for authorizing communication and evaluating continuity. It separates relationships from the replaceable identities, sessions, routes, paths, transports, and carriers that realize communication and is independent of IP or any particular network layer. The document defines terminology, architectural invariants, layering boundaries, security and privacy requirements, and criteria for evaluating relationship-centric designs; it intentionally omits any wire format, cryptographic suite, routing algorithm, carrier technology, or IANA registry.
The official Abstract page was not reachable on this run, so this description is approximate. By its name, this individual draft appears to address security for MCP (probably the Model Context Protocol) under the proposed 'mcps' effort; no specifics are asserted here. It will be grounded from the official Abstract on the next run.
Defines an extension to the Dynamic Link Exchange Protocol (DLEP) that provides dynamic power constraints to the radio.
The official Abstract page for this individual draft was not reachable on this run, so its scope cannot be confirmed. By its short name ('mws') alone the topic is ambiguous, so no specifics are asserted here. This entry will be grounded from the official Abstract on the next run.
6LoWPAN compression schemes (HC1, IPHC, GHC) elide the IPv6 Payload Length field, relying on the Layer 2 payload length to reconstruct it — an assumption that holds for IEEE 802.15.4 but fails on L2 technologies that enforce a minimum frame size and pad short frames with zeros, most notably Ethernet (46-byte minimum payload). This causes the receiver to reconstruct the wrong IPv6 Payload Length, corrupting packets and breaking protocols. The draft describes the problem, analyzes existing workarounds, and defines a solution based on an Escape dispatch byte (ESC) / ESC Extension Type mechanism that explicitly encodes the IPv6 Payload Length when L2 padding may be present.
Specifies Best Current Practice for making decisions in IETF Working Groups, updating Section 3.3 of RFC 2418.
ADS-B is a widely mandated aircraft surveillance technology that lacks security and privacy: messages are easy to spoof with cheap hardware, every message carries the aircraft's unique 24-bit ICAO address (enabling tracking and owner lookup), and the 1090 MHz channel is nearing saturation. This document applies the IETF TESLA protocol together with X.509 certificates issued by ICAO member states to authenticate ADS-B messaging, using the 8PSK phase-overlay scheme from the ADS-B MOPS to carry the extra security data with negligible channel impact. It also enables a flight-authorization scheme and a privacy-preserving method that assigns random 24-bit identifiers while still allowing blind authentication.
Specifies integration of two composite post-quantum signature schemes into the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, each combining the post-quantum ML-DSA algorithm with an elliptic-curve algorithm (Ed25519 and ECDSA, respectively) for security against both quantum and classical adversaries.
Defines the 'ars' URI scheme for representing ARS-1 References in valid URI form. ARS-1 is a deterministic, cryptographically derived reference protocol assigning stable public identifiers to durable digital entities; the scheme provides standard URI notation for these references so they can be used in hyperlinks, QR codes, metadata, and other URI contexts. It does not redefine ARS-1 reference generation, canonicalization, or verification — those remain normative in ARS-1 — defining only URI syntax, encoding, comparison, and resolution semantics.
Defines a reference architecture for direct presentation flows of digital credentials. It introduces a presentation mediator as the active component that manages, presents, and selectively discloses credentials while preserving a set of security and privacy promises that the document also defines.
JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) are URL-safe, JSON-based security tokens carrying claims that may be signed and/or encrypted, and are widely deployed across digital-identity and other protocols. This Best Current Practice updates RFC 7519 with actionable guidance for secure JWT implementation and deployment. It obsoletes RFC 8725, adding further guidance covering threats and attacks discovered since RFC 8725 was published.
This Informational document describes the NFS_ACL protocol, a legacy member of the NFS family that clients use to view and update Access Control Lists stored on an NFS version 2 or version 3 server.
Describes how to encapsulate the Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP, RFC 8762) and its optional extensions (RFC 8972) in MPLS networks. Because Label Switched Paths and Pseudowires carry various services and may use the Control Word, the document specifies encapsulating STAMP test packets with or without the Control Word and/or an IP/UDP header for both LSPs and PWs.
Building on RFC 2501's definition of a MANET as an autonomous system of mobile nodes that may operate in isolation or interface with a fixed network such as the public Internet, this document presents a MANET internetworking problem statement and gap analysis.
Defines a canonical address format encoding used in Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) control messages and in the encoding of lookup keys for the LISP Mapping Database System. This revision obsoletes RFC 8060 and RFC 9306.
Defines a YANG data model that extends the network topology model (RFC 8345) to map network topologies to inventories. It introduces the 'inventory-topology' network type and augmentations for physical entity mappings and capabilities, usable by any overlay topology for service-provisioning validation, network maintenance, and capacity planning.
IKEv2 (RFC 7296) currently supports traditional digital signatures for signature-based authentication. This document specifies a generic mechanism for integrating post-quantum cryptographic digital-signature algorithms into IKEv2, allowing any PQC signature scheme to be included seamlessly in the existing authentication framework. It further describes using NIST-standardized ML-DSA (Module-Lattice) and SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-Based) signatures as IKEv2 authentication methods.
BGP Flow Specification distributes traffic filtering and steering rules across BGP networks. This document extends FlowSpec (RFC 8955/8956) to steer matching flows into Segment Routing Policies (RFC 9256), defining normative procedures that combine FlowSpec NLRI with the BGP Prefix-SID attribute and specific BGP Extended Communities to signal SR-MPLS and SRv6 policy steering.
Specifies how to collect the configuration and state of Segment Routing policies carrying Path Segment and bidirectional path information using BGP-LS. External components can use this information for use cases such as performance measurement, path re-optimization, and end-to-end protection.
Specifies EAP using Privacy Pass Token (EAP-PPT) Version 1. The protocol uses a Privacy Pass token (a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism for authorization, per RFC 9576) for client authentication within EAP (RFC 3748). EAP-PPT must be performed only inside a tunnel-based EAP method.
Extends the Bundle Protocol Endpoint ID (EID) concept into an EID Pattern used to categorize any EID as matching a pattern or not. EID Patterns suit configuration, on-the-wire protocol use, and layperson readability, with scheme-specific optimizations for set membership; each scheme pattern has text and binary encodings, and the 'ipn' pattern is designed to be highly compressible in binary form. The document also defines a PKIX OtherName form to carry an EID Pattern and a rule for matching an EID against a pattern.
Specifies how transport protocols should increase their congestion window when the sender is rate-limited — for example because the sending application supplies no data or because of receiver flow control. It updates RFCs 4341, 5681, 9002, 9260, and 9438.
Expands and corrects the IANA 'XML Security URIs' registry, which lists URIs used with XML digital signatures, encryption, canonicalization, and key management; these URIs identify algorithms and types of information. The document obsoletes RFC 9231.
Audit receipts for automated data access attest only to what a gateway recorded, leaving open what was changed before disclosure and whether the receipt set is complete. This draft defines two evidence structures: Transformation Evidence, a per-disclosure statement of which classes of values were transformed and how (carrying counts and class names but never values); and Coverage Reconciliation, comparing a source's own activity counters against a receipt set over a time window and classifying the result (matched, observed-without-receipt, receipted-without-observation, excluded, or indeterminate) rather than a bare pass. Both are meant to be registered as Signed Statements on a SCITT Transparency Service; the document defines only the evidence payloads.