Explains that Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) applies in principle to all transport protocols, but that UDP saw little ECN use until QUIC was widely adopted, leaving the UDP socket ECN APIs poorly documented. The RFC reports on experiments with those APIs to enable ECN over UDP in Chromium on Apple, Linux, and Windows platforms. It is a snapshot of platform support at the time of writing, and readers are advised to consult current platform documentation for updates.
Introduces a Power Conserving Path Placement Strategy (PCPPS). During periods of low demand, PCPPS concentrates traffic onto a small set of network resources so that other resources become idle or nearly idle and can be powered down. When demand increases again, PCPPS redistributes traffic as required. The aim is to save energy in the network without degrading service when demand rises.
Updates RFC 6532, which permits almost any UTF-8 string in the local part of an email address. The draft slightly restricts which addresses may appear in header fields so they are simpler to use and handle. It is one of two companion documents: this one is described as simple to implement and limited to globally viable rules, while the companion defines more complex rules that account for regional usage.
Extends OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749) so a client instance can attach an attestation tied to its cryptographic key when contacting an authorization or resource server. The attestation proves the instance's authenticity as vouched for by a client attester, while keeping the intended recipient hidden from that attester. The mechanism can also be used as a client authentication method under OAuth 2.0.
Notes that the Benchmarking Methodology Working Group has extended its lab-characterization work from physical to virtual network functions, and that the ongoing shift from virtual-machine-based to container-based network functions affects how benchmark setups are configured, particularly around resource allocation and networking. The draft offers additional guidance for benchmarking containerized network functions running on general-purpose hardware.
Defines an extension to BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) that lets operators filter traffic by the origin Autonomous System of the source IP address. It is aimed at DDoS mitigation: when attacking sources are numerous or constantly changing but all belong to one source AS, matching on that origin AS gives a stable filtering criterion. The component fits within the FSv2 framework and complements existing flow-spec actions.
Extends BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) so traffic can be matched by the origin Autonomous System of its destination IP address. This helps when many or rapidly changing target addresses belong to a single AS, for example during DDoS mitigation or traffic redirection. It mirrors the source-AS filter and plugs into the FSv2 architecture.
Introduces a bitwise match filter component for source and destination IPv4/IPv6 address fields within the BGP Flow Specification framework. The components let operators match on arbitrary bit patterns of an address, enabling dynamic, symmetric traffic load-balancing. This extends flow-spec matching beyond simple prefix comparisons.
Notes that BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) provides an extensible framework for disseminating traffic flow rules, with traditional actions such as rate-limiting, redirection, and marking. For applications needing dynamic bandwidth optimization, the draft defines a new traffic filtering action for selective, on-demand traffic compression across network domains, implemented with BGP Extended Communities aligned with the FSv2 architecture.
Describes how BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) distributes traffic filtering rules and actions through a modular, TLV-based structure, and adds a new component type under the Routing Filter Family that matches traffic by the BGP community associated with a packet's destination IP address. The mechanism is intended for use within a single administrative domain, supporting community-level filtering.
Explains that BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) uses an extensible, TLV-based filter architecture to distribute traffic filtering rules, and adds a new component type under the Routing Filter Family that filters traffic by BGP community within one administrative domain. The match is performed against the community attached to the route for the packet's source IP address, supporting community-level filtering.
Describes a new BGP extended community attribute for advertising the node-ID. The abstract is brief and focuses on carrying node-ID information through BGP extended communities; fuller detail on encoding and use would require the document body.
By its name, this draft (draft-lin-idr-flowspec-quic, in the IDR work area) probably defines a BGP Flow Specification component or action for matching or handling QUIC traffic. The official abstract could not be retrieved on this run, so this description is approximate and should be confirmed against the document itself; it will be grounded from the abstract on the next run.
Proposes a lightweight way to fingerprint an IS-IS link-state database so operators can quickly check whether routers in a large network are synchronized and estimate how fast flooding spreads. It defines YANG model extensions for reading the fingerprint data and an optional TLV that carries the fingerprint in Hello and CSNP PDUs, letting neighbors compare databases without exchanging full CSNPs.
Describes a generic congestion-avoidance solution for local link congestion within Segment Routing. Building on TI-LFA Fast Reroute, it lets the selected shortest path bypass a congested link without creating micro-loops. A key property is that the mechanism requires no protocol extensions, relying only on existing Segment Routing and TI-LFA machinery.
Observes that communication between AI agents, and between agents and tools, is expected to be pivotal in 6G systems. Drawing on 3GPP TR 22.870, which outlines use cases and potential service requirements for AI-agent communication in 6G, the document presents examples from that report and proposes possible requirements for agent communication protocols.
Recalls that the ZONEMD resource record verifies the integrity and helps confirm the authenticity of an entire DNS zone, storing a configurable cryptographic hash that acts as a checksum during zone transfers. RFC 8976 defined one collation method, SIMPLE, suited to small, rarely changed zones. This draft introduces MERKLE3, a method for large, frequently changing zones that uses a Merkle tree so the digest can be computed in parallel and updated incrementally.
Updates the Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode for ESP as described in RFC 7402. The document aligns the BEET description with the addition of BEET mode for IKEv2, without changing any of the processing defined in RFC 7402. It is essentially a clarifying and alignment update rather than a change to on-the-wire behavior.
Defines a standard structure for how an AI agent presents a consequential decision to the human it acts for, and how that person accepts, declines, amends, or rejects it. The structure has eight fixed parts and is carried as a field in a Model Context Protocol tool result so any client can display it uniformly. It includes a dual-veto mechanism (one option changes the possible answers while keeping the question, the other rejects the question and reopens deliberation) and a JCS/SHA-256 content digest so a resolution can reference the exact envelope it answers. It is Informational and adds no new transport.
Discusses possible additional Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) requirements that arise when service segmentation is considered in related CATS use cases such as AR/VR and distributed AI inference. It builds on the existing CATS problem statement and requirements to capture what segmenting a service into stages implies for steering decisions.
Explains that service segmentation is an emerging deployment paradigm that splits a service into several distributed subtasks forming a pipeline, and considers how to direct sessions across subtask instances in sequential, parallel, and iterative pipelines. It introduces a MUP Sequence Session Transform for ordered traversal and addresses keeping services running during pipeline updates, especially when stateful subtasks are involved.
Describes Proof of Stateful Integrity (PSI), a format for issuing signed receipts over digital records. Each receipt links the SHA-256 hash of a canonically serialized JSON record to an issuer signature, a monotonically increasing sequence number, and a Merkle root built with the RFC 6962 method, optionally with an external timestamp reference. Anyone holding the record, receipt, and issuer public key can verify it offline. PSI provides evidence of integrity, origin, and ordering only, not truth, legality, safety, or compliance. This revision supersedes revision 01 and drops zero-knowledge, multi-party-computation, and inclusion-proof claims the reference implementation does not provide.
Defines the Compliance-Receipt HTTP response header, a Structured Field that points to a Proof of Stateful Integrity (PSI) receipt for a response. The header's signature covers all security-relevant parameters and proves only that the issuer sealed a digest of the response. The draft is explicit that the name is misleading: the header does not demonstrate legal or policy compliance by the response or the service.
Specifies the Merkle commitment profile used by Proof of Stateful Integrity (PSI) receipts. It adopts the Merkle Tree Hash and inclusion proof of RFC 9162 without modification, fixes leaf order, and defines how a receipt declares the profile and how a verifier obtains and checks an inclusion proof. A valid proof shows only that a leaf was committed under a root, not that the content is true or lawful. This revision replaces revision 00's lexicographic ordering and odd-leaf duplication, which were incompatible with RFC 9162, and withdraws anchoring claims other than OpenTimestamps.
Defines a profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity (PSI) for logging actions taken by software agents, including language-model calls and tool use. The agent runtime hashes each action locally and seals only the hash, so later changes or deletions of a logged action can be detected. A receipt shows only that a record existed unchanged at a given time; it does not show the action was correct, secure, permitted, or legal, and assigns no liability. This revision removes revision 00's liability language and aligns the Merkle commitment with draft-singh-psi-merkle-01.
Defines PSI-Age, a profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for age-assurance decisions, letting a relying party later show which provider decision it relied on. Each record is sealed as a receipt so alteration, reordering, or removal is detectable, and only digests are sealed. It shows integrity and ordering only, not a person's age, the method's accuracy, or legal compliance. The draft is superseded in substance by draft-singh-apex-psi-09 and kept for continuity, and it withdraws revision 00's zero-knowledge claim since no such proof system is specified.
Defines PSI-02, a profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for carbon-sequestration measurement records such as field samples, remote-sensing extracts, and calculation inputs. Each record is sealed as a receipt so later changes, reordering, or removal are detectable, and only digests are sealed. The profile covers integrity and ordering only; it does not establish that sequestration occurred, that a methodology was followed, or that a credit is valid. This revision corrects revision 00, whose abstract had described disability-services evidence.
Defines PSI-03, a domain profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for dispatch instructions and metered responses between a virtual power plant operator and its distributed energy resources. Each record is sealed as a PSI receipt so later alteration, reordering, or removal is detectable, and only digests are sealed. It shows integrity and ordering only; it does not show that a resource performed as instructed, that metering is accurate, or that any market rule was met. This revision aligns the body with the title, which earlier revisions had paired with practitioner identity bonds.
Defines PSI-04, a profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for records about vulnerable people, such as clinical-trial participants and recipients of disability or aged-care services. Each state change is sealed as a receipt linked to the previous one, so later alteration or omission becomes detectable, and only digests are sealed so no personal data leaves the record holder. It shows integrity and ordering only and does not show that care was adequate or that any regulation was met. This revision withdraws revision 00's multi-party-computation and zero-knowledge claims and the URI-scheme request.
Defines PSI-07, a domain profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for organic-certification production records such as input purchases, field activities, and inspection notes. Each record is sealed as a receipt so later alteration, reordering, or removal is detectable, and only digests are sealed. It shows integrity and ordering only and does not show that a product is organic or that any certification standard was met. This revision makes the body match the title, which earlier revisions had mismatched.
Defines PSI-08, a domain profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for health-record access events. Each access event is sealed as a receipt so later changes, reordering, or deletion are detectable, and only digests are sealed. The profile covers integrity and ordering, not whether an access was permitted or lawful. This revision aligns the body with the title; revision 00 had paired the title with an abstract about predicate chains.
Defines PSI-09, a profile of Proof of Stateful Integrity for decisions by age-assurance providers. Each record of a performed check, including method and outcome, is sealed as a PSI receipt so later changes, reordering, or deletion are detectable; only digests are sealed. The profile covers integrity and ordering only; it does not establish a person's age, the method's accuracy, or compliance with any age-assurance law. This revision replaces revision 00, whose abstract had wrongly described tribunal verdicts, so the body now matches the title.